We develop a model wherein a risk-neutral but ambiguity-averse principal contracts with a risk-averse agent who has a risky project. Both the agent and the principal can observe the project output and a public signal. The correlation between the output and the public signal is private...

Thai Abstract:: การศึกษาครัง้ นี้มีวัตถุประสงค์ดังนี้ 1) เพื่อศึกษาลาดับความสา คัญของแรงจูงใจในการทางานสา...

In this article, we establish a model of competitive insurance markets based on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where insurers can perform risk classification tests either before insurance contracts are issued (underwriting) or when coverage claims are filed (post-loss test). However, insurers...

We advance the literature starting from the work by Dixit (2000), who considers the effect of the principle of good faith on adverse selection. Introducing a post-loss risk misrepresentation testing in a competitive insurance market model, we identify a sufficient condition to guarantee that a...