Motivated by VAR evidence, we develop a monetary DSGE model where an agency problem between bank financiers, stemming from limited liability and unobservable risk taking, distorts banks' incentives leading them to choose excessively risky investments. A monetary policy expansion magnifies these...

Empirical research suggests that lower interest rates induce banks to take higher risks. We assess analytically what this risk-taking channel implies for optimal monetary policy in a tractable New Keynesian model. We show that this channel creates a motive for the planner to stabilize the real...

How important is the risk-taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem which distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these...

Motivated by VAR evidence on the risk-taking channel in the US, we develop a New Keynesian model where low levels of the risk-free rate induce banks to grant credit to riskier borrowers. In the model an agency problem between depositors and equity holders incentivizes banks to take excessive...