The political discussion on energy efficiency is focusing more and more on the building sector due to its susceptibility to potential market failures like the negative external pollution effects of CO2 emission. Using a discrete choice approach, this paper aims at deriving factors which increase...

Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a...

The political discussion on energy efficiency is focusing more and more on the building sector due to its susceptibility to potential market failures like the negative external pollution effects of CO2 emission. Using a discrete choice approach, this paper aims at deriving factors which increase...

We contribute to the literature on how program design affects program performance among vulnerable groups by studying the effects of varying the subsidy level and program procedures in an energy efficiency assistance program targeting low-income households in Germany. Eligible households...

We study the effect of a subtle change in the choice architecture on offsetting behavior. In a large-scale field experiment, we examine repeated voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the online purchase of long-distance bus tickets. In the control group, travelers had the...

We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...

In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....

We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the...

Given the vital and controversial debate on fairness concerns in international climate negotiations, the acceptance of a climate treaty may be fostered if the distribution of costs and benefits from global environmental protection is perceived to be “fair”. Since an agreement must be...

We provide the first estimate of the money equivalent of procedural changes in public assistance programs. Observing 77,305 appliance replacement decisions in an energy efficiency assistance program targeting low-income households, our RDD design exploits two quasi-exogenous temporal...