I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that,...

We study a dynamic model of monopolistic provision of commitment devices to sophisticated, Strotzian decision makers. We allow for unobservable heterogeneity at the contracting stage in the agents' preferences for commitment vs. flexibility. The first-best contracts under complete information...

Prominent research argues that consumers often use personal budgets to manage self-control problems. This paper analyzes the link between budgeting and self-control problems in consumption-saving decisions. It shows that the use of good-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for...

Evidence from various choice domains shows that the presentation order of the attributes of the available options can have important effects on decisions. We introduce a decision-theoretic model that allows for such effects. We identify simple properties of observable behavior that characterize...

We consider information markets where its consumers care about some unknown state of fundamentals and about coordinating with others. Moreover, information consumes attention while being consumed and attention can be monetized, so that information suppliers compete for it. We examine how the...

Prominent research argues that consumers often use personal budgets to manage self-control problems. This paper analyzes the link between budgeting and self-control problems in consumption-saving decisions. It shows that the use of good-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for...

This paper develops a theory of optimal provision of commitment devices to people who value both commitment and flexibility, and whose preferences differ in the degree of time inconsistency. If time inconsistency is observable, both a planner and a monopolist provide devices that help each...

This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...

This paper studies the problem of delegating the allocation of resources across multiple categories to an agent who has better information on their benefits. It focuses on a tractable, natural class of delegation policies that impose a floor or cap on the allocation to each category, a...