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Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance : experimental evidence

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2016

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574107

The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2016

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586814

Chapter 17. Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources

Snmez, Tayfun; Utku nver, M. - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 781-852). 2011

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025686

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Heller, Christian-Philipp - 2016

We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance : experimental evidence

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 130 (2020) 626, pp. 356-392

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195739

Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple college admissions environment

Shorrer, Ran I.; Sóvágó, Sándor - 2017

In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772987

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801

Everyone likes to be liked : experimental evidence from matching markets

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476792

Matching with slot-specific priorities : theory

Kominers, Scott Duke; Sönmez, Tayfun - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 683-710

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671965

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2019

Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138798