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Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs

Bhargava, Mohit; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 867-885

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392719

Ordinally bayesian incentive compatible voting rules

Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 72 (2004) 2, pp. 523-540

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001978018

Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity

Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava - In: Social choice and welfare 27 (2006) 1, pp. 175-187

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003363465

Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal voting mechanisms

Ehlers, Lars H.; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Mishra, Debasis; … - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447205

Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

Ehlers, Lars H.; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Mishra, Debasis; … - In: Journal of mathematical economics 88 (2020), pp. 31-41

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012589924

Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs

Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava - In: Social choice and welfare 57 (2021) 1, pp. 63-95

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616171

The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences : a general formulation and a limit result

Sen, Arunava - In: Social choice and welfare 12 (1995) 3, pp. 277-292

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001184563

Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

Sen, Arunava - In: Economics letters 70 (2001) 3, pp. 381-385

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001550122

The Gibbard random dictatorship theorem : a generalization and a new proof

Sen, Arunava - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 515-527

This paper proves stronger versions of the Gibbard random dictatorship theorem using induction on the number of voters. It shows that when there are at least three voters, every random social choice function defined on a domain satisfying a Free Triple at the Top property and satisfying a weak...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505650

Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium

Abreu, Dilip; Sen, Arunava - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000789171