In this study, focusing on the period 1996-2010, we conduct an empirical investigation of how warnings by industry peer firms about future earnings affect CEO compensation structure. These warnings contain information about the industry, signaling dim industry prospects and possibly triggering...

Some CEOs decide voluntarily to issue a warning when they expect a negative earnings surprise. Prior research suggests that warnings contain incremental information beyond actual earnings; warning firms tend to experience permanent earnings decreases. This paper investigates whether compensation...

Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2011-05 eliminates the option to present other comprehensive income (OCI) in the statement of changes in stockholders' equity. This study empirically investigates whether this mandatory change of OCI presentation format achieves FASB's stated objective of...

Corporate acquisitions are arguably one of the most important and biggest decisions CEOs have to make; yet many acquisitions do not create value for shareholders. We examine whether CEO compensation is reduced when the fair value of the acquired business units are written down (i.e. goodwill...