This paper considers general bargaining outcomes under coalition structures formed by an external patent holder and firms in oligopoly markets. The main propositions are as follows. For each coalition structure, the kernel is a singleton; thus, the number of licensees that maximizes the patent...

O'donoghue and Zweimüller (2004, J. of Econ. Growth), a seminal work, showed that broadening leading breadth in patent protection can stimulate innovation. However, the empirical literature has consistently found skeptical results on the positive effect. To fill the gap, we build another...

O'donoghue and Zweimuller (2004, J. of Econ. Growth), a seminal work, showed that broadening leading breadth in patent protection can stimulate innovation. However, the empirical literature has consistently found skeptical results on the positive effect. To fill the gap, we build another...

We consider stable licensing schemes that are combinations of lump-sum fee and per-unit royalty realized as bargaining outcomes in transferring a new technology from a technology holder to oligopolistic firms through licensing. The licensing schemes on which the technology holder and licensees...

In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as...