This paper shows that agency problems result from controlling-minority shareholder conflicts have a nonlinear causal relation with firm cash holding, and this relation hinges critically on the strength of investor protection. Using a direct measure of controlling shareholder's entrenchment...

Institutional investors’ common blockholdings within an industry produce an information advantage, allowing them to differentiate between the industry-wide and firm-specific nature of bad news released by peer firms and avoiding selling on false spillover signals (i.e., “panic exit”),...

This paper examines the relation between share pledging and corporate risk-taking in an environment featured by strong government intervention and high information opacity. We find that during the years 2005 through 2015, the level of share pledging is associated with less volatile earnings and...

We revisit the research question centering around the impact of the market for corporate control on stock price crash risk. Using a newly-developed takeover index from Cain, McKeon, and Solomon (2017) that comprehensively considers existing state takeover laws, federal statutes, and state court...

We document that an increased likelihood of losing important stakeholders like key talents can lead to a higher stock price crash risk. Our test exploits U.S. state courts’ staggered rejections of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD), which improves the ability of key talent to switch...