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Collusion and delegation under information control
Asseyer, Andreas - 2020
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310
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Collusion and delegation under information control
Asseyer, Andreas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1547-1586
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488
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Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy Joseph - 2015
, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because … nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043494
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Cartels and bribes
Burguet, Roberto; Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2021
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697250
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Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - 2013
problem is to certify the private signal and make it public. When collusion between the certifier and the agent is an issue … if this certification raises the specter of collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212662
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
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Corruption and Competition in Procurement
Celentani, Marco; Ganuza, Juan José - 2002
We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014155034
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Corruption and Competition in Procurement
Celentani, Marco; Ganuza, Juan José - 2002
We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014106565
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Building Political Collusion : Evidence from Procurement Auctions
Coviello, Decio - 2010
We investigate the relationship between the time politicians stay in office and the functioning of public procurement. To this purpose, we collect a data set on the Italian municipal governments and all the procurement auctions they administered between 2000 and 2005. Identification is achieved...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141778
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Delegation and recruitment in organizations : the slippery slope to "bad" leadership
Çakır, Selcen; Matakos, Konstantinos; Tukiainen, Janne - 2022
challenge. We characterize an equilibrium delegation rule with two key properties: a) some high-skilled politicians may select …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014229853