This paper summarizes the results from public goods experiments investigating the effect of nonbinding agreements on cooperation. Unlike previous studies, this experimental study was conducted among members of forest user groups in Ethiopia and Nepal with long histories of social...

This paper examines whether cooperative behavior by respondents measured as contributions in a one-shot public goods game correlates with reported pro-forest collective action behaviors. All the outcomes analyzed are costly in terms of time, land, or money. The study finds significant evidence...

This paper summarizes the results from public goods experiments investigating the effect of nonbinding agreements on cooperation. Unlike previous studies, this experimental study was conducted among members of forest user groups in Ethiopia and Nepal with long histories of social...

This paper examines whether cooperative behavior by respondents measured as contributions in a one-shot public goods game correlates with reported pro-forest collective action behaviors. All the outcomes analyzed are costly in terms of time, land, or money. The study finds significant evidence...

This paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the...