The budget of a university essentially depends on the number of students it enrols. In multi-department universities resources created in one department may be redistributed to other departments. This redistribution affects the way academics share their working time between research and teaching...

The owner of a real option does not have the necessary expertise to manage the investment project and needs to contract with an expert in order to exercise the real option. The potential managers (the experts) have private information about their respective cost of investing in the project. The...

This paper proposes a dynamic theory of capital budgeting and compensation when investment information is decentralized and division manager can inefficiently deploy capital. The incentive cost and firm policies vary monotonically with stored liquidity. After bad performances, liquidity is low,...

We characterize the optimal dynamic mechanism for capital budgeting and managerial compensation. The division manager privately observes the project productivity at each point in time as well as an initial signal that governs the productivity evolution. We show that the optimal allocation can be...

We examine the role of non-venture private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high-powered incentives, patient capital and business independence...

The relationship between investment efficiency and investment transparency is investigated using a sample of Australian listed company capital expenditure announcements between 2008 and 2014. We suggest two opposing hypotheses to explain why investment efficiency may influence the...

Prominent research argues that consumers often use personal budgets to manage self-control problems. This paper analyzes the link between budgeting and self-control problems in consumption-saving decisions. It shows that the use of good-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for...

This paper studies the problem of delegating the allocation of resources across multiple categories to an agent who has better information on their benefits. It focuses on a tractable, natural class of delegation policies that impose a floor or cap on the allocation to each category, a...

We examine the effect of ownership and governance structures on what is arguably a firm's most valuable asset: its reputation. We model reputations based on alterable organizational and structural firm characteristics rather than the personal characteristics of the management team. We show that,...

Theory suggests a commitment to voluntary disclosure may improve firm investment over time. Our findings support this argument. We document that voluntary disclosure commitment is associated with the more profitable exercise of firm investment opportunities. Additionally, prior research...