We model career concerns in a regime where a linear incentive contract includes a mix of a publicly observed performance measure and a second, correlated, private measure that is not observed by the labor market. Under this quot;mixquot; regime, we find that agent effort and total agency payoff...

We find that fixed effects related to the location of a firm's headquarters explain variation in broad based option grants after controlling for industry effects and firm characteristics traditionally known to affect option granting. Location matters because of local labor market conditions and...

This study investigates whether paying higher wages motivates employees to provide higher effort and whether firm profit moderates this relation. Consistent with gift exchange (Akerlof 1982) and reciprocity (Rabin 1993) models, my experimental results show that workers provided more effort when...

It is now common place for management commentators to argue that Western assemblers should learn from and attempt to replicate Japanese practices. One of these key practices relates to the way in which Japanese assemblers work closely with subcontractors to cooperate on design and development...

Markets have a remarkable capacity for producing efficient resource allocations when information about relative values is dispersed across economic agents. We explore the use of market mechanisms inside the firm to address a resource allocation problem, and compare the outcome with the first-...

We study turnover and promotions of division managers in multidivisional firms. Turnover is negatively related to divisional accounting performance, positively related to industry performance, but not significantly related to firm performance or the performance of other divisions. Consistent...

In this paper, the principal rewards an agent's farsighted effort both in the short- and long-term, with the short-term reward based on a noisy, forward-looking performance measure and the long-term reward based on a potentially less noisy, trailing performance measure. The main result is that...

A case study of the implementation of the balanced scorecard in a large local government authority is reported. Based on interview data, the factors that were perceived by senior managers to be important to the success or failure of the implementation are analysed. It is determined that...

Using car dealership data, we examine the relevance of forward-looking (FL) and contemporaneous (CO) measures for pay-for-performance incentives (bonus, annual raise, promotions) for long-horizon employees. Economic models suggest that while contracts with FL performance measures mitigates the...

The balanced scorecard has been hailed as one of the major developments in management accounting in the last decade. Lipe and Salterio (2000) show that one of the key features of this development, the inclusion of measures that are unique to the strategic objectives of a business unit, tend to...