By assuming a Pareto-type distribution of bank sizes within banking systems, we investigate the effect of changes to Zipf's slope parameter (a) and the sample size to the behaviour of different concentration indexes, such as the 3-bank concentration ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the...

We examine if debtholders monitor banks and if such monitoring constrains risk-taking. Leveraging an unexplored experiment in the U.S. that changes the priority structure of claims on banks' assets, we provide novel insights into the debate on market discipline. We document asymmetric effects...

The recent financial turmoil and the bailouts of some large financial institutions in the US and Europe have raised major concerns that the increased size and complexity of financial institutions may give rise to negative ramifications for systemic risk. In this paper, we investigate whether...

How can competition enhance bank soundness? Does competition improve soundness via the efficiency channel? Do banks heterogeneously respond to competition? To answer these questions, we exploit an innovative measure of competition [Boone, J., A New Way to Measure Competition, EconJnl, Vol. 118,...

We exploit a unique dataset of executive turnovers in community banks to test the micro-mechanisms of discipline by examining the monitoring and influencing role of different stakeholders. We find executives are more likely to be dismissed in risky institutions. Examining the roles of...

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivizes...