The use of stock-based compensation for U.S. CEOs has increased significantly throughout the 1990s. Research interest, in particular on stock option compensation, has similarly increased, yet contradictory results create questions about the theoretical underpinnings. Therefore, we revisit the...

The use of stock-based compensation for U.S. CEOs has increased significantly throughout the 1990s. Research interest, in particular on stock option compensation, has similarly increased, yet contradictory results create questions about the theoretical underpinnings. Therefore, we revisit the...

This study tests whether firms in the electric utility industry alter their compensation policies in response to the recent and dramatic changes that the 1992 Energy Policy Act imposes on their operating and regulatory environment. The 1992 Act intensifies competition in the utility industry by...

Little is known about the economic environments and determinants of the compensation arrangements for outside board members. As delegated monitors of corporate management, board members act as shareholders' agents. Thus, a potential for misaligned interests exists, requiring in turn incentive...

We examine the agency-theory-based economic determinants of the firm-specific CEO compensation-performance sensitivity by using CEO cash compensation (salary plus bonus) as the proxy for CEO compensation and annual accounting earnings as the measure of firm performance. From agency theory, the...