We measure risk aversion and patience in a non-incentivized way using a representative sample of the Hungarian adult population. We elicit risk aversion with a task similar to Gneezy and Potters (1997)’s investment game and find that females risk about 8.5 % less than males when we do not...

Does students' hand tremble after marking three consecutive identical answers in a multiple choice test? We design an experiment to study if students who face a multiple choice test with streaks of identical answers achieve less points and we investigate some potential mechanisms. We do not find...

We attempt to link laboratory-based measures of preferences with measures of school performance. We measure in an incentivized way risk, time, social and competitive preferences and also cognitive abilities of university students and look for associations between these measures and two important...

We study how response time in a laboratory experiment on bank runs affects withdrawal decisions. In our setup, the bank has no fundamental problems, depositors decide sequentially (if to keep the money in the bank or to withdraw) and may observe previous decisions depending on the information...

We study how lines form endogenously in front of banks when depositors differ in their liquidity needs. Our model has two stages. In the first one, depositors choose the level of costly effort they want to exert to arrive early at the bank which determines the order of decisions. In the second...

We collect data on time preferences of a representative sample of the Hungarian population in a non-incentivized way and investigate how patience and present bias associate with important life outcomes in five domains: i) educational attainment, ii) unemployment, iii) income and wealth, iv)...

A recent stream of experimental economics literature studies the factors that contribute to the emergence of financial bubbles. We consider a setting where participants sorted according to their degree of risk aversion trade in experimental asset markets. We show that risk sorting is able to...

This paper introduces the possibility of signaling into a finite-depositor version of the Diamond-Dybvig model. More precisely, the decision to keep the funds in the bank is assumed to be unobservable, but depositors are allowed to make it observable by signaling, at a cost. Depositors decide...

We study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a common bank. Depositors decide in sequence between withdrawing or keeping their money...