We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run and that there is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale...

We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how - during crisis - deposit insurance affects depositor behavior. Our focus is on Belgium where the government increased explicit deposit insurance coverage and implemented implicit deposit insurance arrangements. Estimating sorting below...

I study the relation between shadow banking and financial stability in an economy in which banks are susceptible to self-fulfilling runs and in which government-backed deposit insurance is limited. Shadow banks issue only uninsured deposits while commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured...

We study the effects of bank transparency on both banks' asset and liquidity risks, and ultimately, on banking sector stability and welfare. We show how enhanced bank transparency increases banks' vulnerability to excessive deposit outflows, but this threat of a liquidity crisis incentivizes...

We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance. We characterize the policymaker's optimal choices of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost of bank failures. We find that riskadjusted...

We study the interaction between a government's bailout policy and banks' willingness to impose losses on (or \bail in") their investors. The government has limited commitment and may choose to bail out banks facing large losses. The anticipation of this bailout undermines a bank's private...

Short-term debt is commonly used to fund illiquid assets. A conventional view asserts that such arrangements are run-prone in part because redemptions must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. This sequential service protocol, however, appears absent in the wholesale banking...

This paper studies the optimal determination of deposit insurance (DI) when bank runs are possible. In a variety of environments, the welfare impact of changes in the level of deposit insurance coverage exclusively depends on three sufficient statistics: the sensitivity of the likelihood of bank...