In this study, we examine the differences in preference for renewable resources that arise as a result of the production locale; with the focus on the fish in individual nation's territorial waters, lakes and ponds etc. In addition, we look at incomplete regulation which often occurs in renewable...

Using differential games, this paper analyzes output controls of internationally shared renewable resources such as transboundary natural forests. A two-country, two-good (that is, shared-resource and nonresource based goods) general equilibrium trading model is employed for this purpose. Each...

This paper discusses the results of the application of Jones' Inequality to the n-country, m-good Ricardo–Graham model. In the Jones' Inequality model, the number of countries is the same as the number of goods produced. On one hand, if a country is divided into regions for the purposes of...

This paper examines the effects of international trade and resource management in a two-country model where each country controls domestic harvest to prevent over-exploitation of an internationally shared renewable resource (e.g., fishery resources). We show that contrary to conventional wisdom,...

We examine trade and strategic interaction between countries that enforce technical measures for resource management which restricts capacity of exploitation to protect an internationally shared renewable resource. The technical measures are common management tools in fisheries (e.g.,...