This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that "money buys policies". Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to "buy access" and managerial time to "utilize access" - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism...

This paper develops a lobbying-by-firms model that draws on a more realistic characterization of the lobbying process; influence-seeking requires both money to ‘buy access’ and managerial time to ‘utilize access’. This, more realistically grounded, modeling approach furnishes theoretical...

International financial assistance (loans and grants) can potentially raise recipients'' welfare in two ways, by affecting a direct resource transfer and by facilitating efficiency-enhancing reforms. In practice, barriers to reform limit the potential of assistance to deliver these two...

Economic adjustment and reform programs, including those supported by international financial institutions (IFIs), must cope with informational asymmetries and special interest politics. This presents a particularly serious issue when IFIs make structural economic reforms a condition for...