We consider the combined impact of agency problems and social fairness norms on venture capital/entrepreneur contracting and performance. Particularly, we develop a behavioural game-theoretic model in which a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur negotiate over their respective equity shares,...

With our planet's environment facing increasing threat of irreparable damage, academics, practitioners, and policy-makers are becoming more focused on the incentives of individuals, corporations, and governments to act in the interests of the environment. Since the environment is a public good,...

We consider the impact of fairness and moral hazard in a principal-agent bargaining model, where the agent can affect the size of the surplus by his actions. Our main results are as follows; a) the offer predicted by the basic fairness model (excluding moral hazard) results in inefficient...

A standard result in bargaining with symmetric information is that agents exploit all gains from trade, and reach efficient agreements immediately. Models of delayed and inefficient agreements are typically based on asymmetric information regarding bargainer types. However, such models often...

We analyse a bargaining game in which two players (the internal stakeholder and the external party) bargain over the allocation of a fixed 'cake'. The internal stakeholder decides whether to bargain directly with the other player (involving Nash Bargaining). On the other hand, the internal...

We present a theory of entrepreneurial behavior that explores the relationship between overconfidence and successful firm outcomes, such as acquisition or IPO. In our model, increasing overconfidence produces two conflicting effects on the probability of a successful outcome: it not only induces...

In this paper, we conduct a quantitative, qualitative and neuro-economic experiment investigating the effects of risk-preferences and emotions on investors' trading strategies and performance. The focus of our experiment is a computerised simulated trading game, where investors decide, on a...

This paper is a case study-based investigation of aspects of the current paradigmatic approach to ‘good' corporate governance with its focus on the interlinked roles of internal control and risk management procedures, internal audit and external audit, overseen and co-ordinated by a formal...

In recent years, the corporate sector has been rocked by managerial fraud and scandals. In this paper, we analyse, employing a behavioural and psychoanalytical game theoretic approach, two particular phenomena that may lead to managerial fraud in the corporate sector: a) the tendency for fraud...

We analyze the effects of reciprocity on the performance of a two-player team working in a venture. The players initially negotiate a fair, ‘reference-point,' contract, which determines their cash-flow rights and the direction of the venture (in terms of a project-choice). They then exert...