A technique to determine closed-loop Nash equilibria of n-player differential games is developed when their dynamic state-control system is composed of decoupled ODEs. In particular, the theory of Lie point symmetries is exploited to achieve first integrals of such systems.

We model cooperative games when externality affects the payoffs of coalitions. The coalitional games among countries committing to pollution reduction can be easily embedded into such a framework. We evaluate the individual welfare for countries joining the International Environmental Agreements...

This paper explores under what conditions social stigma exists as an additional sanction in criminal law from a behavioral law and economics perspective. A distinction is made between the court as an institution specialized at discovering and assigning blame and the rest of the society that...

We consider the joint effect of profit and Pigouvian taxation in a model of imperfect competition. We show that, when both profit taxation and Pigouvian taxation/subsidy are used, the former is no longer neutral. The two fiscal tools are substitutes, and for any profit taxation rate there exists...

We model the interplay between capital accumulation for production and environmental externalities in a differential oligopoly game with Ramsey dynamics. The external effect is determined, alternatively, by sales or production. While the externality does not affect the behaviour of...

We identify a class of noncooperative games in continuous strategies which are best-response potential games. We identify the conditions for the existence of a best-response potential function and characterise its construction, describing then the key properties of the equilibrium. The...

We revisit the debate on the optimal number of firms in the commons in a differential oligopoly game in which firms are either quantity- or price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of firms maximizing industry...

In this paper we derive analytic implicit form conditions for the qualitative analysis of government spending multipliers and the optimal level of government spending in presence of non-separability between private and public components of aggregate demand. Using the simplest neo-classical...

We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly using a differential game approach where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment...