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. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to … within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985854
number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366554
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016
We examine repeated Cournot oligopolies when there is uncertainty about the number of players. Already in the static game, such uncertainty can imply outputs above Nash. For the repeated game, we argue that the uncertainty may lead to a novel strategy, based on a notion of limited depth of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077530
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitorś product-market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301237
We characterize revenue maximizing auctions when the bidders are intermediaries who wish to resell the good. The bidders have differential information about their common resale opportunities: each bidder privately observes an independent draw of a resale opportunity, and the highest signal is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949875
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders' independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders’ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457