We model a financial market where privately informed investors trade in a limit order book monitored by professional liquidity providers. Price competition between informed limit order submitters and professional market makers allows us to capture tradeoffs between informed limit and market...

We develop a tractable model of a limit order market where informed and liquidity investors compete with a professional liquidity provider who has a monitoring advantage. We apply our model to study the impact of exogenous transaction costs and investor patience on trading activity and market...

Latency delays - known as "speed bumps" - are an intentional slowing of order flow by exchanges. Supporters contend that delays protect market makers from high-frequency arbitrage, while opponents warn that delays promote "quote fading" by market makers. We construct a model of informed trading...

Trading activity surges associated with latency arbitrage are costly, as they lead to both lower liquidity and inefficient investments in order processing capacity that remains idle 90% of the time. A congestion message fee on liquidity-taking orders alleviates both concerns. The fee surges...

Latency delays — known as “speed bumps” — slow the execution of orders at an exchange, often to protect market makers against latency arbitrage. We study informed trading in a fragmented market, where one exchange introduces a latency delay on market orders. While liquidity improves at...

In financial markets, clients entrust their capital and data to financial infrastructure providers who are vulnerable to breaches. We develop a model in which infrastructure providers compete to provide secure and efficient client services, in the presence of a cyber-attacker. In equilibrium,...