We model competition between risk-neutral principals who hire weakly risk-averse agents to produce a good of variable quality. The agent can increase the likelihood of producing a high-quality good by providing costly effort. We demonstrate that, when the agent is strictly risk-averse, the cost...

We present stylized facts on the asset pricing properties of cryptocurrencies: summary statistics on cryptocurrency return properties and measures of common variation for secondary market returns on 222 digital coins. In our sample, secondary market returns of all other currencies are strongly...

We consider the role of credit ratings when contracts between investors and portfolio managers are incomplete. In our model, a credit rating and a price on a risky bond both provide verifiable signals about a non-contractible state. We allow the investor to both impose ex ante restrictions on...

In this paper, we study how rational agents infer the quality of a good (a product or a service) by observing the queue that is formed by other rational agents to obtain the good. Agents also observe privately the realization of a signal that is imperfectly correlated with the true quality of...

We consider a model of intermediated trade for a financial asset. Agents' valuation for the asset includes both a private and a common value component. A third party posts a price at which trade can occur, and a buyer and seller simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the trade. We...