When reelection is uncertain, the election mechanism may provide insufficient incentives to politicians to implement the socially desirable policy. In this paper, we show that incentive contracts which the candidates offer themselves during the campaign can help to alleviate the problem even if...

Based on contribution patterns to parties in Germany and elsewhere, we suggest that European democracies should use a mixed system where private funding can play a larger role than public funding. In Germany the high level of public funding for parties can be reduced without expecting...

Based on contribution patterns to parties in Germany and elsewhere, we suggest that democracies should use a mixed system where private funding can play a larger role than public funding. In Germany the high level of public funding for parties can be reduced without expecting undesirable effects...

In diesem Aufsatz werden der Stromkonsum und die Kosten, die den Haushalten in Grundsicherung in Deutschland daraus entstehen, untersucht. Dazu wird ein Datensatz ausgewertet, der mehr als 22.000 Haushalte mit Leistungsbezug nach SGB II und SGB XII in verschiedenen Haushaltszusammensetzungen...

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...