We study the impact of a merit-based incentive payment system on provider behavior in the primary care setting using new experimental methods that leverage healthcare simulations with patient actors. Our approach allows us to exogenously change a provider's incentives and to directly measure the...

In the static directed search model, sellers and buyers play a game where sellers post prices, buyers observe the posted prices and approach sellers, and transactions occur between sellers and one of the buyers who approaches them. Even though there are gains to trade, sellers with no...

I experimentally investigate an infinitely repeated market entry game with an informed incumbent firm who knows demand and an uninformed entrant firm who does not. The uninformed firm's profits each period serve as a signal about demand, but the informed firm may signal jam the uninformed firm...

I experimentally investigate a new game that modifies the prisoner's dilemma. In this game, as opposed to the regular prisoner's dilemma, there is no tradeoff between cooperation and strategic risk (uncertainty regarding the other player's strategy) that is the leading explanation for low...

We conduct a novel experimental test of the Coase conjecture using subjects' private information about preferences for fairness. In an infinite horizon bargaining game, a proposer proposes a division of chips, until a responder accepts. Given private information about fairness preferences and...

This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the "rules of the game in society." The question then becomes why do different societies develop...

I investigate finitely repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring where both mutual effort and mutual shirking are Nash equilibria of the stage game. The treatment variable is the number of repetitions. I find that period 1 effort rates are increasing in the number of repetitions, but...