In this paper, we generalize the notion of a communication equilibrium (Forges 1986, Myerson 1986) of a game with incomplete information by introducing two new types of correlation device, namely extended and Bayesian devices. These new devices explicitly model the `thinking process' of the...

To investigate the effects on Papua New Guinea’s economy of substantial liquified natural gas revenues arriving in 2015, we employ a model to examine the macroeconomic effects of a scalingup of natural resource windfall revenues and the implications for a variety of policy responses. The model...

We introduce a novel framework to study targeted policy interventions. Agents: 1) differ both in their likelihood of and loss from interaction, 2) exert negative externalities through interaction, and 3) can exert costly effort to isolate. Additionally, a planner can select a subset of agents to...

To investigate the effects on Papua New Guinea's economy of substantial liquified natural gas revenues arriving in 2015, we employ a model to examine the macroeconomic effects of a scalingup of natural resource windfall revenues and the implications for a variety of policy responses. The model...

We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record,...