This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that …

the politician has engaged in corruption. But do voters punish an elected executive for corrupt acts carried out under his … or her watch, even if the executive is not personally implicated in corruption? To answer this question, we present the … results of an embedded experiment from a nationally-representative survey in Brazil. Using vignettes that describe a …

When do resource revenues increase corruption? I develop a model of public good provision by a politician who obtains … revenues unambiguously increase public goods spending, and decrease corruption (in the form of bribes) if the marginal social … increases corruption (in the form of theft). Hence, a political resource curse emerges when resources provide ‘too much …

Does corruption increase or decrease with public goods spending? I develop a model of public good provision by a rent … decrease corruption (in the form of bribes) if the marginal social value of the public goods from which the bribes are … effect on public spending, but unambiguously increases corruption (in the form of theft). Hence, a political resource curse …

citizens. -- Mass Media ; Corruption ; Selection and Discipline of Politicians …