We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player...

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...

This paper models the stolen base play in baseball as a simple inspection game. The model offers equilibrium predictions relating the frequency with which a stolen base play is attempted, and the frequency with which it is successful. Using an extensive play-by-play dataset from 37 Major League...

We analyze symmetric, two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations and discrete type spaces. Relaxing previous restrictions on the distribution of types and the valuation structure, we present a construction that characterizes all symmetric equilibria. We show how the search...

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

One of the original objectives of the (logit) quantal response equilibrium (LQRE) model was to provide a method for structural estimation of behaviour in games, when behaviour deviated from Nash equilibrium predictions. To date, only Chapter 6 of the book on quantal response equilibrium by...

We report data on the experimental articles published in the last two decades in seven prominent, general-interest economics journals, considering laboratory and other types of experiments separately. In addition, we also look at time trends in the characteristics of the published experimental...

We re-analyse participant behaviour in standard economics experiments studying voluntary contributions to a public good. Previous approaches were based in part on a priori models of decision-making, such as maximising personal earnings, or reciprocating the behaviour of others. Many participants...

We experimentally contrast mathematical versus operational explanations of Tullock lottery contests. We contrast a protocol explaining the contest in terms of probability of winning, with an operational approach that carries out the random component of the contest as an explicit lottery each...