has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms …) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the …

game theory to assess the economics of transboundary river water allocation in a simple model of river sharing. This model …We survey the economics of transboundary river water allocation, which emerged in the 1960s and has matured over the … attention to the strategic aspects of transboundary river water allocation. These strategic aspects are captured by employing …

river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative … would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and …

river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative … would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and …

In a river claims problem, agents are ordered linearly, and they have both an initial water endowment as well as a … properties which have particularly relevant interpretations for the river claims problem. Specifically, these properties relate … to situations where river flow is uncertain or highly variable, possibly due to climate change impacts. The only solution …

possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it … Core. We find that most of the bestknown allocation rules are unstable in this setting, except for the Constrained Equal …

commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and … Core …