results. In this case, the optimal contract either ignores the team measure completely or uses it to create a conditional … study a principal-multi-agent relational contracting model in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It … joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other (team incentives …

relational contract could establish cooperation through peer monitoring even under relative performance evaluation, which … observed individual signals should be aggregated to a commonly observed team signal …

types, we find that the optimal contract may be very simple, paying the supervisor a flat wage independent of his type and … his evaluation of the agent's effort. Such a contract induces the neutral type of supervisor to report the agent … performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of an optimal contract under informational asymmetries …

cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high … contract is misspecified, i.e., when he is offered the robust contract, but his true effort cost is constant. I find that …

Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex …

characterization of the collusive-supervision contract shows that collusion should be allowed with one agent only …

transmitted to the public through contract litigation. In a career concern framework, the performance of the long-lived seller is … additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract …

principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides … the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high performance, the agent reaches the over-compensation region, where … he receives excessive benefits compared to the contract without ambiguity, while after low performance, he enters the …

be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …