We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ, whereas the distribution of unit-specific...

We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter 0, whereas the distribution of unit-specific...

We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ, whereas the distribution of unit-specific...

We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ, whereas the distribution of unit-specific...

We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ, whereas the distribution of unit-specific...

Many panel data methods, while allowing for general dependence between covariates and time-invariant agent-specific heterogeneity, place strong a priori restrictions on feedback: how past outcomes, covariates, and heterogeneity map into future covariate levels. Ruling out feedback entirely, as...

Many panel data methods, while allowing for general dependence between covariates and time-invariant agent-specific heterogeneity, place strong a priori restrictions on feedback: how past outcomes, covariates, and heterogeneity map into future covariate levels. Ruling out feedback entirely, as...

In theory, free and fair elections can improve the selection of politicians and incentivize them to exert effort. In practice, incumbency advantage and coordination issues may lead to the (re)election of bad politicians. We ask whether these two forces compound each other. Using a regression...