Alger and Weibull (2013) present a model for the evolution of preferences under incomplete information and assortative matching. Their main result is that Homo Moralis - who maximizes a convex combination of her narrow self-interest and "the right thing to do" - is evolutionarily stable, if it...

Alger and Weibull (2013) present a model for the evolution of preferences under incomplete information and assortative matching. Their main result is that Homo Moralis – who maximizes a convex combination of her narrow self-interest and “the right thing to do” – is evolutionarily stable,...

Alger and Weibull (2013) ask the question whether a combination of assortative matching and incomplete information leads to the evolution of moral or altruistic preferences. Their central result states that Homo Hamiltonenis - a type that has moral preferences with a morality parameter equal to...

Rand et al. (2013) present a finite population model to explain the evolution of fair behaviour in the ultimatum game. They find that mutation and selection can balance at population states that resemble human behaviour, in that responders on average evolve sizable thresholds for rejection, and...

Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level (Sober and Wilson, 1998; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Wilson and Wilson, 2007; Boyd and Richerson, 2009; Simon, 2010; Simon et al., 2013; Luo, 2014; van Veelen et al., 2014; Luo and Mattingly, 2017). Cooperation...

Rand et al. (2013) present a finite population model to explain the evolution of fair behaviour in the ultimatum game. They find that mutation and selection can balance at population states that resemble human behaviour, in that responders on average evolve sizable thresholds for rejection, and...

Repetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games is to assume that there is an exogenous probability with which every interaction is repeated. If it is sufficiently likely that interactions are repeated, then reciprocity and cooperation...

We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma with implementation errors, and look at the resulting population dynamics, both analytically and with simulations. We show that with implementation errors, pure equilibrium strategies represented by finite state automata exhibit a structure that we...

The likelihood of cancer emergence is highly dependent on the underlying tissue structure. This article gives evolutionary explanations for why natural selection fails to select for tissue structures that would minimize the likelihood of cancer. In a second step, a mathematical framework is...