We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders'...

We exploit a unique dataset of executive turnovers in community banks to test the micro-mechanisms of discipline by examining the monitoring and influencing role of different stakeholders. We find executives are more likely to be dismissed in risky institutions. Examining the roles of...

We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: Stakeholders'...

We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a bdquo;laboratory setting‟ by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline:...

This paper estimates the magnitude of key effects on the real economy from financial sector stress. We focus on the short-run feedback effect from market-based indicators of financial sector risk to the real economy through the credit channel, and estimate this effect on an economy-wide (macro)...

This paper examines whether inward FDI incentives can soften the political constraints associated with trade liberalization. After introducing the role of capital inflows into the political economy of trade framework pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995 and 1996), the paper traces the...