This paper revisits Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport’s (2014) proposal of tradable immigration quotas [Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 115, pp. 94–108]. We show that their main results hinge on tacit assumptions. In general, the combination of tradable quotas and matching is neither...

In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval)

A principal wants to procure a discrete number of homogeneous units from a finite set of agents. Each agent has an increasing and convex cost function, whose exact shape is unknown to the principal. Utility is quasilinear in money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that are strategy-proof...

Ever since the major inflow of refugees (the "refugee crisis") in 2015 and 2016, there has been heated debate about the appropriate distribution of refugees in the EU. Current policies revolve around mandatory quotas, which disregard the preferences of EU members and refugees alike. This problem...