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Winker, Peter - In: Wirtschaftsdienst 76 (1996) 7, pp. 372-380

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011467569

The effect of policyholders' rationality on unit-linked life insurance contracts with surrender guarantees

Li, Jing; Szimayer, Alexander - 2010

method. We show that the rationality of the policyholders has a significant effect on average contract value and hence on the … fair contract design. We also present the separating boundary between purely exogenous surrender and endogenous surrender …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293371

The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employees

Demougin, Dominique M.; Fabel, Oliver - 2004

The current study integrates the repeated game approach to implicit contracts and the analysis of explicit bonus rules based on subjective performance evaluation to determine the optimal structure of the compensation scheme for the average white- collar employee. In contrast to previous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296871

Störung der Vertragsparität

Kirstein, Roland; Schmidtchen, Dieter - 2004

'absence of contract parity'. It is argued under which circumstances the absence of contract parity calls for regulative action …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296894

Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance

Kirstein, Roland; Schmidtchen, Dieter - 1997

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior which we call litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296902

What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts?

Tykvová, Tereza - 2000

Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297726

Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors: The impact of reputation and bargaining power on contractual design

Schmidt, Daniel; Wahrenburg, Mark - 2003

explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298250

Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment

Krueger, Dirk; Uhlig, Harald - 2005

given period, after having observed her income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i … can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment e.ectively locks in the agent with an intermediary …. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298298

Subjective evaluation and information-efficiency in organizations

Mitusch, Kay - 2001

Subjective performance evaluation is modeled as auditing without commitment. A superior, who has to decide whether an where to audit the work done by a subordinate, takes into account all interim information he has obtained in the meantime. This invites workers to cover up and withhold...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300528

Wie viel Vertrag braucht die deutsche Milchwirtschaft? Erste Überlegungen zur Ausgestaltung des Contract Designs nach der Quote aus Sicht der Molkereien

Steffen, Nina; Schlecht, Stephanie; Müller, Hans-Christian - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302279