the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two …

) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

the clan by a 'dualize and extend' procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …

backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the … this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached. …

, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced …We prove that every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Given a TU game … cover of the given game. Therefore, a Walrasian equilibrium for the induced coalition production economy always exists. The …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the … maximum net profit that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not … allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost …

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of … core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games …, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we …

In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of … the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such … value for games with coalition structure under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter extended …