I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners' dilemmas between pairs of players selected chosen from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement....

We consider the political economy of a monetary union wheremember governments attempt to influence the policy of the commoncentral bank. Modeling this as a common agency with incentivecontracts, we show that if incentives are all that matters for the bank,the equilibrium implements a weighted...

We propose a new market design for trading financial assets. The design combines three elements: (1) Orders are downward-sloping linear demand curves with quantities expressed as flows; (2) Markets clear in discrete time using uniform-price batch auctions; (3) Traders may submit orders for...

Vortrag von Prof. Avinash K. Dixit Professor Emeritus of Economics, Princeton University

Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic...