In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...

Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane, that faces a problem of locating public facilities to be used by its members. The cost of every facility is financed by its users, who also face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We assume that the...

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

We consider a model of the 'world' with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known...

This paper examines the lasting impact of the alignment of African countries during the Cold War on their modern economic development. We find that the division of the continent into two blocs (East/West) led to two clusters of development outcomes that reflect the Cold War's ideological divide....

We analyze and evaluate the different decision rules describing the Council of Ministers of the EU starting from 1958 up to date. All the existing studies use the Banzhaf index (for binary voting) or the Shapley-Shubik index (for distributive politics). We argue that the nucleolus can be...

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the nite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting...

We show that dynamic bargaining games are characterized by a continuum of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are patient. In fact, we show that there is a continuum of equilibria close to any alternative satisfying a simple linear...

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...