This paper considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. Under an assumption on the information available to workers, it is shown that...

We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labour market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages...

This paper develops theories of multi-sector search by unemployed workers. The paper then attempts to distinguish empirically whether unemployed workers target their job search efforts exclusively on a particular sector at any point in time, or whether they search in a 'non-targeted' fashion...

This paper presents a new model of firms' decisions on training in a context of potential worker mobility. Such worker mobility can be influenced by employers coordination, namely through the operation of no-poach agreements and employers' associations (EAs). We then present supporting evidence...

This paper studies firm-provided training in a context of potential worker mobility. We argue that such worker mobility may be reduced by employers' associations (EAs) through no-poach agreements. First, we sketch a simple model to illustrate the impact of employer coordination on training. We...

The fluctuations in incomes inherent in rural communities can be attenuated by reciprocal insurance. We develop a model of such insurance based on self-interested behaviour and voluntary participation. One individual assists another only if the costs of so doing are outweighed by the benefits...

In this paper we conduct a theoretical analysis of the implications of a union which can exploit the existence of firm labour adjustment costs. We consider a model involving a large number of identical firms facing a single, economy-wide union. We solve (i) for the Markov perfect equilibria with...

We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable...

Following insights by Bewley (1999a), this paper analyses a model with downward rigidities in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on a year of entry to a firm, and develops an equilibrium model of wages and unemployment. We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment under conditions...

This paper analyses a model in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry to a firm, and develops an equilibrium model of wage dynamics and unemployment. The model is developed under the assumption of worker mobility, so that workers can costlessly quit jobs at any time. Firms on...