In a recurring game, a stage game is played sequentially by different groups of players. Each group receives publicly available information about the play of earlier groups. Players begin with initial uncertainty about the distribution of types (representing the preferences and strategic...

In a recurring game, a stage game is played consecutively by different groups of players, with each group receiving information about the play of earlier groups. Starting with uncertainty about the distribution of types in the population, late groups may learn to play a correct Bayesian...

Consider a probability distribution governing the evolution of a descrete-time stochastic process. Such a distribution may be represented as a convex combination of more elementary probability measures, with the interpretation of a two-stage Bayesian procedure. In the first stage, one of the...

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be maintined...

This short survey discusses recent findings on the robustness of Nash equilibria of strategic games with many semianonymous players. It describes the notion of structural robustness and its general consequences, as well as implications to particular games, such as ones played on the web and...

Conditions of information independence are important in information economics and game theory. We present notions of partial independence in Bayesian environments, and study their relationships to notions of common knowledge.

How should a coalition of cooperating players allocate payoþs to its members? This question arises in a broad range of situations and evokes an equally broad range of issues. For example, it raises technical issues in accounting, if the players are divisions of a corporation, but involves...

A central question in game theory and artificial intelligence is how a rational agent should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a simple model of a game with additional costs...