Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes and furniture. Because of complimentarities (or substitution effects) between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets or bundles of...

A classic result of Korte and Hausmann [1978] and Jenkyns [1976] bounds the quality of the greedy solution to the problem of finding a maximum value basis of an independence system (E,ℐ)$$ \left(E,\mathcal{I}\right) $$in terms of the rank‐quotient. We extend this result in two ways. First,...

Cutting planes from the Boolean Quadric Polytope can be used to reduce the optimality gap of the NP-hard nonconvex quadratic program with box constraints (BoxQP). It is known that all cuts of the Chvátal–Gomory closure of the Boolean Quadric Polytope are A -odd cycle inequalities. We obtain a...

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...

Government procurement and allocation programs often use subsidies and setasides favoring small businesses and other target groups to address fairness concerns. These concerns are in addition to standard objectives such as efficiency and revenue. We study the design of the optimal mechanism for...

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...