We prove some core convergence theorems for finite economies without monotone preferences or free disposal of commodities. When these assumptions are relaxed, the relationship between the continuum and the large finite economies is lost. Extra conditions are needed, in general, to obtain...

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point...

The procurement of supplies is often conducted through the buyer analogue of an auction. Sealed bids are submitted and the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. Although this method may be an optimal way of selling an object, an additional complication arises in the case of purchasing a...

An example shows that there are well-behaved infinte signaling games with no sequential equilibria. We explore the relationship between equilibrium outcomes of the infinite game and those of approximating games. Consider a sequence of signaling games approaching a limit game. A "(sub)sequence of...

Signaling games with infinite action spaces may have no sequential equilibrium. We prove that adding cheap talk to these games solves the non-existence problem; the sequential equilibrium outcome correspondence is upper hemi-continuous. In addition, when the signaling space has sufficiently many...

We examine market-clearing prices and allocations in economies where agents' demand functions are undominated relative to their beliefs about other agents' actions. For sufficiently large economies and give certain restrictions on beliefs, the resulting allocations are nearly competitive.

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We...

Using detailed loan transactions-level data we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market, and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For...

We investigate stochastic choice when only the average and not the entire distribution of choices is observable, focusing attention on the popular Luce model. Choice is pathindependent if it is recursive,in the sense that choosing from a menu can be broken up into choosing from smaller...