We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage...

In einem einfachen theoretischen Erklärungsansatz werden Aspekte eines internationalen Handels in differenzierten Gütern diskutiert. Neben homogenen Gütern können insbesondere differenzierte Güter intraindustriellen Güteraustausch begründen. Von dieser Form der internationalen...

Since the seventies, the Federal Republic of Germany has become increasingly integrated in the world economy through it's high rates of foreign direct investment carried out by German multinational enterprises. In the limelight of the 'job export1 debate which paralleled these investment flows...

In a recent survey of intra-industry trade indices Kol and Mennes (1986) suggested to make a basic distinction between the study of matching trade flows and that of the similiarity oftrade patterns. The present paper shows that in both cases measures of intra-industry trade may be expressed...

Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but potential for future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's referral fee and its own entry decision. We first characterize the platform's optimal...

This paper introduces harassment in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue....

Sequential contracting with multiple employers is a common feature of modern labor markets. Employment relations often terminate due to raids. When a worker is raided, the initial employer may enjoy an informational advantage over the raiders, as she is likely to have better information on the...

Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the...

We show that the presence of a strategic tax policy increases the incentive for a horizontal merger compared to the situation with no tax policy. Thus, we point towards a new factor, viz., strategic tax policy, for increasing the incentive for a horizontal merger that has been ignored in the...

We show the effects of the bargaining power of labour unions on product innovation under decentralised and centralised wage bargaining. In this context, we show the implications of preference function, which affects the market size. A higher union bargaining power increases innovation if...