We study the e.ects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. A more protective antitrust policy may have conflicting e.ects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net e.ect...

The paper considers the communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social choice rules. A key distinction is whether we restrict to the traditional one-stage mechanisms or allow multi-stage mechanisms. For one-stage mechanisms, the paper shows that for...

We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation...

We study users' response to sponsored-search advertising using data from Microsoft's Live AdCenter distributed in the 'Beyond Search' initiative. We estimate a structural model of utility maximizing users, which quantifies 'user experience' based on their 'revealed preferences' and predicts user...

These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of bandit auctions.

We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs need not be time-separable. We derive a formula...

These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of bandit auctions.