We study binary action network games with strategic complementarities. An agent acts if the aggregate social influence of her friends exceeds a transfer levied on the agent by a principal. The principal seeks to maximize her revenue while inducing everyone to act in a unique equilibrium. We...

This paper examines how the effort choices of workers within the same firm interact with each other. In contrast to the existing literature, we show that workers can affect the productivity of their co-workers based on income maximization considerations, rather than relying on behavioral...

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in laboratory experiments. One group of low informed subjects make predictions in sequence. In a matched pairs design, another set of high informed subjects observe the decisions of the first group and make predictions....

Consumer prices in many markets are persistently dispersed both across retail outlets and over time. While the cross sectional distribution of prices is stable, individual stores change their position in the distribution over time. It is a challenge to model oligopolistic price adjustment to...

Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive...

Payoff security combined with reciprocal upper semicontinuity is sufficient for better-reply security, and consequently for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in compact, quasiconcave games by Reny's (1999) theorem. Analogously, diagonal payoff security combined with upper...

This paper studies Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields where one player has a head start in the form of additional troops on one of the battlefields. Such games arise naturally in marketing, electoral competition, and military conflict. Sion and Wolfe (1957) have shown that, if the...

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as assumed by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form...

It is a common experience for present-day consumers making an international payment via credit or debit card to be invited to choose the currency in which they wish to have the transaction executed. While this choice, made feasible by a technology known as dynamic currency conversion (DCC),...

A random variable is difference-form decomposable (DFD) if it may be written as the difference of two i.i.d. random terms. We show that densities of such variables exhibit a remarkable degree of structure. Specifically, a DFD density can be neither approximately uniform, nor quasiconvex, nor...