the clan by a 'dualize and extend' procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …

, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice') which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced …

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d?Aspremont and …

) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …