In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they...

In this note we present an experiment to compare the two competing fairness theories by Bolton / Ockenfels and Fehr / Schmidt. For most experiments that these theories have previously been applied to, they make similar predictions so that it is difficult to compare their predictive accuracy. We...

We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal...

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether...

Electronic Commerce environments increasingly witness a conflict on the subject of e-privacy: While marketers want to maximize their customer knowledge and grasp the identity of their online users, consumers often want to stay anonymous and not reveal private information. The conflict suggests...

Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioral model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during...

In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations...

We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid feeling guilt by letting down another player. We compare estimates of WTP under the assumption that higher-order beliefs are in equilibrium (i.e. consistent with the choice...