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The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to assume that people … illustrate how reputation based choice of opponents can explain both the emergence and deterioration of cooperation. We show that … empirical and experimental evidence of cooperation is consistent with our hypothesis that people behave so as to minimize the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208482
We analyze a cooperation game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponents' propensity … two agents agree to play. Pareto optimal cooperation is evolutionarily stable when reputation perfectly reflects … propensity to cooperate. With some reputation noise, there will be at least some cooperation. Individual concern for reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208494
that group identity is a key factor in the explanation of intergroup cooperation and competition. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012534379
Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. Usually these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In this Dictator game study, we investigate whether social framing effects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286337
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is characterized by symmetry, ex-post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014520271
This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261094
The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305970
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334971
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325075
This paper reviews recent developments in nonparametric identi.cation of mea- surement error models and their applications in applied microeconomics, in particular, in empirical industrial organization and labor economics. Measurement error models describe mappings from a latent distribution to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445721