We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....

We study the impact of gender norms on the distribution of paid and unpaid labor between women and men in an intra-household bargaining model featuring endogenous social norms. In contrast to the previous literature, which assumes a homogeneous social norm, agents are connected via explicitly...

Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of...

This paper shows the importance of technological synergies among heterogeneous firms for aggregate fluctuations. First, we document six novel empirical facts using microdata that suggest the existence of important technological synergies between trading firms, the presence of positive...

The computational time required to solve and estimate dynamic economic models is one of the main constraints in empirical research. The Endogenous Grid Method (EGM) proposed by Carroll (2006) is known to offer impressive speed gains over more traditional stochastic dynamic programming methods,...

The present paper investigates the functioning of an Emission Trading System (ETS) and its impact on the diffusion of environmental-friendly technological innovation in the presence of firms' strategic behaviours and sanctions to non-compliant firms. For this purpose, we study an evolutionary...

The purpose of this paper is to formulate and study a game where there is a player who is involved for a long time interval and several small players who stay in the game for short time intervals. Examples of such games abound in practice. For example a Bank is a long-term player who stays in...

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new pairs if is in their interest. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one exists? If so, how quickly? Are some stable matchings more likely to be obtained by this process than others? In...

A matching game is a cooperative game (N; v) defined on a graph G = (N;E) with an edge weighting w : E ! R+. The player set is N and the value of a coalition S N is defined as the maximum weight of a matching in the subgraph induced by S. First we present an O(nm+n2 log n) algorithm that tests...